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points out that Philip actually turned the tables on his Athenian opponents in the negotiations of
344/343 first by rejecting all proposals because of the inclusion of the single issue of Amphipolis and
then by coming back in 342 with his own version of the expanded guarantee, thus putting his
opponents in the position of responsibility for the final collapse of efforts to create a system
guaranteeing the peace and independence of the less powerful city-states a characteristically shrewd
diplomatic maneuver; for Athenian frustration, see, for example, in 341, Dem. 9 (Third Phil .). 118-19,
129-30; in 340, Aeschin. 3 (In Ctes .). 67-68.
[98]
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In the Fourth Philippic he criticizes neutral policy more explicitly, pointing out that "many so-called
'protectorates' are springing up everywhere, and all states are rivals for the leadership, but
unfortunately some hold aloof, in mutual jealousy and distrust, and so each state has isolated
itself Argives, Thebans, Lacedaemonians, Corinthians, Arcadians, ourselves."[99]
But why did Demosthenes and his anti-Macedonian colleagues fail to win the support of nonaligned
states? The answer evidently is that Philip made neutrality look very attractive. And this was shrewd
diplomacy. From Philip's point of view encouragement of neutrality was the ideal tool for a policy of
divide et impera . From the very beginning of his conflicts with the Greek city-states, Philip seems to
have understood perfectly that, on the one hand, fragmenting his opposition was a vital military
necessity and, on the other, achieving this end by exploiting the existing framework of Greek
diplomacy offered legitimacy both for himself and his partisans. Philip also had an enormous
advantage: his basic need was not for more allies but simply for fewer opponents. The only advantage
of bilateral alliances lay in the creation of competing obligations that might result in the neutrality of a
given state previously committed by alliance to states whose hostility Philip could not avoid. But more
often states had no preexisting commitment that needed to be counteracted. Philip's goal was to make
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these states believe that their position was secure (or that some specific advantages would come to
them) provided only that they refrained from opposing him. He must have known that if he succeeded
in this, many states would turn a deaf ear to the appeals of his implacable enemies.
Between 340 and 338 Philip pursued this strategy with considerable success. For example, having
seized the entire grain fleet as it left the Euxine in 340, he released all ships from states with which
[99]
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he was not in direct conflict.[100] Again in 339, having approached the Thebans with an offer of
alliance, he conceded that if alliance was unacceptable, he would respect their neutrality providing only
that they allowed him free passage through Boeotia.[101] Finally, also in 339, he called upon his allies
in the Peloponnesus to send aid for the Amphictyonic War against Amphissa, when he found himself
stalled at Elatea by a hostile coalition led by Athens and Thebes.[102] But few contemporaries would
have been fooled into believing that Philip truly expected active support as a result of this appeal. His
purpose was rather to manipulate public opinion by emphasizing his legal right (as appointed protector
of the sanctuary at Delphi) and thereby increasing the pressure on abstaining states either to join him
in defending the sanctuary or, at least, to continue avoiding the charge of supporting impiety. No
action was taken by the Peloponnesian states discussed above. But at the time it is entirely possible
that Philip's ambassadors made a compromise offer like that just made to Thebes of neutrality as an
acceptable alternative. It was only when the new Hellenic League was founded at Corinth and the
option of neutrality was officially precluded by the compulsion of majority rule that the other shoe fell
and the neutrals saw clearly that they had lost their independence just as surely as the allies who
fought and died at Chaeronea.[103]
Summary
With the alignment of states during the conflict ending at Chaeronea, neutrality in the fourth century
came full circle. In the last decade of the fifth century the Agrigentines had refused all assurances of [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]