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peacekeepers in the Bosnia IFOR15 and follow-on SFOR.16 Another focal point
was internal defense reform that is the so-called Planning and Review Process
(PARP).17
The July 1997 Madrid Summit issued invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic to join the Alliance. It also enhanced PFP to be more relevant
and operational.18 The Madrid Summit also marked the introduction of the EAPC
that replaced the NACC, and the creation of the NATO Russia Permanent Joint
Council (PJC) and NATO Ukraine Commission to enhance consultation and
cooperation with Russia and Ukraine.
By the April 1999 Washington Summit, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic had just become the first PFP partners to join the Alliance, which was
then heavily engaged in a bombing campaign of Serbia. In the KFOR, sixteen PFP
partners contributed to the operation,19 in addition to NATO s three new allies. The
Summit also approved the new Alliance Strategic Concept, which underscored
the importance of partnerships, launched a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI)
to improve operability among Alliance forces and, where applicable, between
Alliance and partner forces in non-Article 5 operations. It also approved a third
PARP cycle that further enhanced partner force planning procedures to make
them more closely resemble the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ).20
The 1999 Summit also introduced the MAP as a visible manifestation of NATO s
Open Door (Article 10) policy with a clear set of Allied expectations from
prospective members.21 The MAP Annual National Plans (ANPs) generated by
the nine22 aspirant partners would allow each to set its own objectives and targets
on preparations for possible future membership. This framework and experience
prepared PFP well for the challenges of the war on terrorism.
Building a cooperative security climate after 11 September
Since 11 September 2001, NATO and many partner governments have struggled,
with varying degrees of success, to reshape their defense capabilities to deal with
the new risks posed by global terrorism. While the defense budgets of most other
long-time NATO allies have remained unchanged and the overall capabilities gap
between the US and other allies has widened, NATO committed itself to a broader
functional and wider geographic area of engagement.
Still, as NATO began to plan operations in and around Afghanistan, PFP
demonstrated its utility in bolstering and facilitating NATO operations in the
NATO enlargement and Russia 99
Caucasus and Central Asia. Moreover, at their first meeting after the 9/11 attacks,
EAPC defense ministers reaffirmed their determination to exploit PFP to increase
cooperation and capabilities against terrorism. Consistent with NATO s realization
that it must place greater emphasis on meeting the challenges of asymmetric
warfare, the EAPC approved new PARP ministerial guidance23 and adopted an
Action Plan 2002 04 and the Civil Emergency Action Plan regarding possible
chemical, biological, or radiological attacks.
To better address these challenges, the November 2002 Prague Summit approved
the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), NATO Response Force (NRF), and
new NATO command structure. The small NATO Response Force with high tech
capabilities for expeditionary missions was its centerpiece. If implemented, these
initiatives would provide a more constructive burden-sharing arrangement for
NATO in the post-9/11 risk environment.
The Prague Summit also endorsed the military Concept for Defense against
Terrorism that calls for improved intelligence sharing and crisis response
arrangements [and commitment with partners] to fully implement the Civil
Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan & against possible attacks by &
chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) agents. 24 So too, the EAPC adopted
the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) on 22 November 2002
that commits partners to take a number of steps to combat terrorism at home and
share information and experience.25 The PAP-T does establish a framework upon
which NATO allies and partners are likely to be engaged in these areas for years
to come.
Although the International Security Assistance Force operations in Afghanistan
(ISAF) commenced in January 2002 with participation of several allies and PFP
partners, NATO did not assume command until 11 August 2003.26 In addition,
in US Central Command s (CENTCOM) Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
in Afghanistan, many NATO allies (to include two new ones Poland and the
Czech Republic) and six PFP partners27 rendered substantial assistance. Finally,
after Saddam Hussein had been toppled in Iraq, NATO provided intelligence and
logistical support to the Polish-led multinational division,28 comprising many allies
and eleven partners, which engaged in stabilization efforts as part of Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF).29
When NATO assumed command of ISAF, this marked the first mission in its
history outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Initially ISAF s mandate was restricted to
security in and around Kabul. In December 2003, the NAC authorized expanding
ISAF to take over command of the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) in Kunduz, leaving eight other PRTs under the US-led OEF military opera-
tion against terrorists in Afghanistan. During 2004, NATO assumed command
of four other PRTs in the north, and in 2005 expanded to two other PRTs in the
west. In December 2005, NATO decided to further expand to the south. As of
31 July 2006 the expanded ISAF comprises 18,500 troops from 37 NATO and
non-NATO countries and covers 13 PRTs accounting for approximately 75 percent
of Afghanistan s territory, while the US-led OEF coalition retains responsibility
for counter-terrorist missions in the east.
100 J. Simon
A way ahead: a strategic vision for PFP s revival
To keep PFP relevant and effective over the next decade, partners need to focus on
developing capabilities to combat terrorism and other transnational threats. New
programs could focus on making interior ministries, police, and border guards
more effective. A revived partnership also now needs to improve its intelligence
cooperation to include sharing of interior (police and border control) and finance
(banking) information. Finally, PFP s budget and functions need to be reexamined
and updated to support future counter terrorist operations to include the counter-
proliferation efforts and missile defense systems outlined in the PAP-T.
Added to these broader functional and wider geographic challenges facing the
Alliance, the relationship between NATO members and PFP partners is changing
dramatically. With seven MAP partners acceding to membership in 2004, there are
more NATO allies (26) than partners (23 leaving Russia and Ukraine, who, while
also members of PFP, have special bilateral relationships with NATO). Allies will
be struggling with the transformation of their own armed forces and security sector
institutions, and with completing the integration of the 10 newest members. The 23
remaining partners have diverse security interests and the majority of them have
much weaker defense establishments and governmental institutions30 than those
now joining the Alliance.
Making Black Sea regional cooperation a reality
The greater Black Sea region has acquired increased strategic importance to
NATO in recent years, particularly since the Alliance assumed command of ISAF
in Afghanistan and provided support to the Polish-led division in Iraq. However,
regional security dialogue and cooperation in this region has been complicated by
lingering disputes, weak governance, and other problems. While there has been
dialogue on economic cooperation in the region, Black Sea regional security
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