[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

include third-generation microcircuit computers utilizing Radio Corporation of America
technology. In 1967 English Electric sold to the USSR its System Four machine with
microcircuits; this machine incorporates RCA patent and was similar to the RCA Spectra-70
series.
The largest single supplier of computers to the USSR has been International Computers and
Tabulation, Ltd. of the United Kingdom, which also licenses RCA technology, and by 1970
had supplied at least twenty-seven of the thirty-three large computers then in Russia. In
November I969, for example, five of the firm's 1900-series computers (valued at $12
million) went to the USSR. These large high-speed units with integrated circuits were,
without question, considerably in advance of anything the Soviets were able to manufacture.
Such machines were certainly capable of solving military and space problems. Indeed, a
computer cannot distinguish between civilian and military problems.
In 1971 the USSR and East European family of general purpose computers known as the
RYAD series was announced. These are based substantially on IBM 360 and 370 computers
illegally diverted into the USSR. This had an important effect of making available to them a
tremendous library of computer software that was RYAD compatible.
Dr. Baker has commented on the current RYAD position:
In the area of available manpower, one of the serious problems afflicting the
Soviet economy is the lack of qualified, highly trained, technical people in the
areas of computers and microelectronics. One cause of this is the lack of
enough computing and electronic equipment to train the next generation of
scientists and engineers. They simply don't have enough equipment to allow
students sufficient 'hands-on' practice at an early stage in their education. The
Soviets are trying to alleviate this problem by producing large, for them,
numbers of RYAD computers  copies of the U.S. IBM System 360's and
370's.17
Soviet Agatha - American Apple II
In mid 1983 the Soviets introduced their first personal computer  the AGATHA (a rather
curious name for a Russian product).
Produced at Zelenograd, outside Moscow, the Agatha was reversed engineered from the
APPLE II. Specifications are similar to the APPLE and the components are either Soviet
produced from reverse engineered U.S. components or imported and bought openly or
clandestinely in Europe or Japan.
Officials at the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences have admitted that the APPLE II served
as a "prototype" for the Soviet Agatha.
In 1985 COCOM set up some new rules for microcomputers and made it legal to export
without license low powered 8-bit computers. Such a machine sells in the West for $100 to
$500.
The response was a flood of computer manufacturers attempting to make elaborate sales
pitches to the multimillion Soviet microcomputer market. If history is any judge, the Soviets
will buy a few thousand and then attempt to reverse engineer and produce in the Soviet
Union. Presumably the microcomputers, although low powered, could have military
applications and indeed this was openly admitted by a major computer manufacturer (New
York Times, February 8, 1985):
"We have no illusions. Some of these are headed for the military."
Military End Use
Confirmation of military end use comes from unimpeachable sources  Soviet engineers
who have worked on copying or reverse engineering in the Soviet Union and later defected
to the West. These engineers have testified before Congress and provide firsthand evidence
of Soviet military use of our technology. Here is a statement from Joseph Arkov, who
graduated from a Soviet engineering school in 1970 and who now resides in the United
States. Arkov worked in Soviet research installations.
If, for example, a new American computer has been obtained by the Soviets,
they will make a military application of it rather than a civilian application,"18
and
In my work in the second research installation I had the assignment of copying
Western and Japanese high technology.
Arkov makes the interesting point that the Soviets are now so far behind technologically
that they can no longer just reverse engineer as previously  they must import even the
technology to manufacture high technology:
They do not have the human resources or the fine tuned equipment required to
produce the high technology machinery they try to copy. Once they know what
makes a given piece of machinery work, they find that they do not have the
technical know-how and equipment to produce the product themselves. That is
why they want Western high technology machines that will enable them to
produce the products. And the Western products they desire the most are those
produced in the United States. That is why they want American high
technology machines with which they can produce the components for high
technology products.
Under Senate questioning Arkov confirmed that the major application of our high
technology is for military end uses.
Mr. Arkov: Well, the task of copying Western technology . . . part of their
assignment was for military. Is that the question?
Senator Rudman: Yes, let me just follow that up. You spoke in your prepared
statement about the use of sophisticated American computers in various Soviet
military operations, and also about the use of semiconductor technology. There
are those in this country who feel that had we not transferred that technology
legally to the Soviet Union  we sold them certain semiconductor technology
and certain sophisticated computer technology in the late sixties and early
seventies  the Soviets would not have achieved the advantages in missilery
which they have made in terms of the enormous throw weight and precision of
their guidance systems. Do you agree with that assessment? Do you think that
the sale of those semiconductors and those computers has given them a
tremendous step forward in their technology in the defense area from your
background and your knowledge?
Mr. Arkov: Yes, I think so. I can't tell exactly. It's hard to estimate the degree
of advantage they got. But they gained there, using American computers and
American semiconductors.19
Control Data Deception
The 1973 Control Data Corporation technical assistance agreement with the Soviet Union
enabled the Soviets to complete phase one of their semiconductor manufacturing plant (see
Chapter Four).
Highly significant is a comparison of Control Data Corporation's public argument to the
media and Congress with this 1973 agreement and its totally one-sided presentation of the
national security argument.
One can only conclude that some CDC statements are deliberate untruths. We make this
statement by comparing Control Data public statements, particularly those of Chairman
William Norris, with internal documents and agreements with the Soviet Union. These
documents are confidential, but copies are in our possession.
On December 19, 1973 William Norris wrote Congressman Richard T. Hanna concerning
public criticism of the CDC proposal to export advanced Cyber computers to the USSR. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]